References:
All references are available on the SharePoint site: https://victoria.vcsg8.com
Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: ZULU
The AOI encompasses the Haurani Arab Republic in its entirety; adjacent Byzantauran frontier provinces (Gaziantep and Kilis); and regional actors with direct influence on the conflict. It includes:
- Haurani regime centers in Damascus, Latakia, Tartus, Homs/Hama corridor, and airfields at Damascus Int’l, Tiyas (T4), Shayrat, Khalkhalah, Hama, and Aleppo.
- HaS‑controlled zones in Raqqa and Deir ez‑Zor and contested belts around Aleppo/Idlib.
- Byzantaura staging hubs, border crossings, and population centers affected by cross‑border fires and refugee flow.
- Regional neighbors enabling transit, sanctuary, or influence: Eastern Tigris, Kurdistan (Qamishli region), and Gandhara.
- External enablers and operational depth: Donovian deployments and logistics through Khmeimim/Latakia/Tartus; maritime approaches in the Eastern Mediterranean; NATO maritime task groups and air corridors through Byzantaura and Gileadia.
The AOI extends beyond the Joint Operations Area to include chemical weapons disposition, extremist financing pipelines, Donovian expeditionary posture, and information operations that may shift conditions in the JOA.
CJTF–LR AIR includes all of Hauran; Byzantauran border provinces of Gaziantep and Kilis; air corridors and forward bases in Gileadia (Muwaffaq Salti AB/KASOTC); and Eastern Mediterranean littorals supporting Donovian deployments (Khmeimim/Latakia/Tartus). The AIR also covers cross‑border LOCs, refugee flows, and information/cyber environments that enable regime, HaS, or Donovian operations.
The CJTF–LR JOA includes western and central Hauran (Damascus, Homs, Hama, Idlib, Raqqa, and Deir ez‑Zor provinces) and the Latakia–Tartus coastal corridor where Donovian expeditionary forces are concentrated. It encompasses Byzantauran frontier provinces (Gaziantep/Kilis) for force protection and sustainment, associated airspace required for buffer enforcement, and adjacent maritime approaches in the Eastern Mediterranean tied to Donovian sustainment and NATO maritime operations.
The CJTF AO focuses on the western urban corridor (Damascus–Homs–Hama–Latakia/Tartus), Aleppo approaches, Raqqa/Deir ez‑Zor axis, and the Byzantauran frontier. Key nodes include regime C2 in Damascus, sector operations centers, integrated air defense belts, Khmeimim/Latakia/Tartus logistics, and air bases at Tiyas/Shayrat. Forward NATO operating locations include Incirlik AB (Adana, Byzantaura) and Muwaffaq Salti AB (Azraq, Gileadia).
Three dominant corridors shape operational maneuver:
- Western Corridor: Coastal plain (Latakia/Tartus to Damascus) favors static defense, urban strongpoints, and protects regime/Donovian LOCs.
- Central Corridor: Mountain/urban belts around Homs/Hama channel movement; key MSRs and river crossings create chokepoints and artillery positions; Castello/M5 approaches are decisive for Aleppo and Hama road interdiction.
- Eastern Corridor: Open desert across Raqqa/Deir ez‑Zor enables mechanized maneuver and rapid displacement but offers limited concealment and cover.
Key implications: defensive depth in the west; canalized approaches near Homs/Hama; exposed maneuver and long LOS in the east; border terrain near Gaziantep/Kilis critical for staging and protection of NATO sustainment.
March conditions feature overcast skies, intermittent rain, and dust storms in eastern provinces. Reduced visibility degrades aviation and ISR fidelity, and wet ground impairs off‑road mobility. Day/night temperature swings drive maintenance and human factors issues. Weather favors defenders in urban belts (Damascus/Homs/Hama) and complicates deep ISR and precision fires timing; dust in the east degrades sensor performance and rotary‑wing operations.
The CJTF faces two principal hostile actors: the Haurani Regime, supported by Donovian advisors and materiel, and Harakat al‑Salasyl (HaS), an extremist organization controlling large swaths of eastern Hauran. The regime retains control of the western urban corridor (Damascus–Homs–Hama–Latakia–Tartus) and key airbases (Damascus Int’l, Tiyas/T4, Shayrat, Khalkhalah). HaS controls Raqqa and Deir ez‑Zor corridors and fields captured armor, indirect fires, and limited air defenses (AAA/MANPADS).
Overall, the Haurani Armed Forces are degraded yet capable of combined arms defense and limited offensive action under Donovian backstopping. Hauran organizes its forces into six components: 1) Army; 2) Arab Air Defense Forces (HAADF); 3) Air Force (HAF); 4) Navy (Latakia/Tartus); 5) Special/Security Services (Intelligence Directorates); and 6) Paramilitary/Auxiliaries (National Defense Forces). In wartime, internal security elements are subordinated to the National Command Authority (NCA). The Supreme High Command consists of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff; service commanders report to the Chief of the General Staff. Refer to sections 9–12 of this annex for detailed ORBATs.
Elite remnants (4th Armored Division; Republican Guard; 14th Special Forces Division) concentrate near Damascus, Homs, and the coastal corridor. Ground combat power emphasizes tube/rocket artillery and BM‑21 variants for area denial and counter‑battery; armored spoiling attacks remain possible but short‑lived. Reserve and cadre formations provide local holding forces along key MSRs.
Residual HAF capabilities include L‑39, Su‑22, MiG‑21/23/29, and rotary‑wing assets (Mi‑8/Mi‑24/SA‑342). Limited airlift persists via Il‑76 operating from Damascus. Donovian detachments (Su‑27/MiG‑29) augment point defense and limited intercepts.
Small coastal fleet concentrated at Latakia and Tartus conducts maritime security, logistics escort, and littoral defense. Composition centers on Osa missile boats, Molniya/Tarantul fast attack craft, limited corvettes, patrol craft, landing craft, and auxiliaries. Fleet readiness is uneven; primary effect is point/littoral denial and sustainment support.
Layered, networked IADS integrates legacy strategic SAMs with mobile tactical systems and point defenses.
- Strategic SAM rings: SA‑5 (S‑200) covering Damascus/Latakia axes; SA‑2/SA‑3 belts around major cities/airfields.
- High‑threat systems: SA‑10 (S‑300) batteries assessed near Homs, Latakia, Tartus; possible coverage for Damascus and Tiyas. Mobile SA‑11/SA‑6 brigades provide gap‑filling coverage along MSRs/airfields. SA‑15/SA‑19 protect high‑value C2/chemical nodes.
- Early warning/C2: Fixed P‑14/36D6 and mobile 96L6/64N6 variants tied to sector operations centers in Damascus/Latakia; fiber/microwave backbones with HF/VHF backup.
- Emission control/TTPs: Radar silence, mobility, decoys, bait/shoot ambush tactics expected after suppression begins.
Chemical stockpiles are dispersed to hardened depots in western Hauran under Donovian oversight. Brigade‑level mixing and delivery equipment is retained; employment against rebels and advisors is confirmed. Likely delivery means include artillery rockets, aircraft bombs, and possibly SRBM.
Overall, Donovian expeditionary elements in theater are configured for area denial and escalation control rather than decisive ground operations. Donovia employs ground advisors/security elements (limited), Aerospace Forces (VVS) detachments, Air Defense (PVO) S‑300PS regiments with Tor/Tunguska point defense, a Navy (VMF) task group for AAW/ASW and logistics, Spetsnaz advisors, and a sustainment flotilla. Forces report through the Donovian General Staff to a theater expeditionary command; service elements retain national ROE. Refer to section 13 for detailed composition.
Limited advisors, security detachments, and logistics elements supporting regime C2/IADS integration and port/airfield operations. No evidence of large Donovian maneuver formations deployed inland.
VVS detachments at Khmeimim/Latakia include Su‑24/25 strike, MiG‑29S fighters, Mi‑24/Mi‑28 attack helicopters, and A‑50 AWACS providing area surveillance and cueing. Sortie generation prioritizes point defense, escort, and ISR support to regime nodes.
VMF task group in the Eastern Mediterranean provides AAW/ASW escort, amphibious lift, and sustainment: Slava‑class cruiser (Moskva), Krivak frigates, Tarantul/Molniya fast attack craft, multiple Ropucha LSTs, oilers, and dry cargo vessels. Primary mission is logistics bridge and maritime signaling.
PVO S‑300PS regiments (606th, 1530th) with Tor/Tunguska point defenses establish defended zones over northern/western Hauran and coastal approaches; integrated with A‑50 cueing and relocatable comms vans. Weapons control tight, with potential ROE shifts to weapons‑free inside declared WEZ.
No declared Donovian CBRN employment authority in theater; advisors likely support regime CBRN security and movement. Protective posture oriented to force protection and contamination management near coastal bases and defended zones.
HaS governs through coercion, employing makeshift MLRS, VBIEDs, and cross‑border rocket/artillery fires into Byzantaura. It fields captured armor, maintains foreign fighter inflows, and operates local air defense (AAA/MANPADS). It seeks expansion around Aleppo/Idlib to marginalize non‑HaS rebels.
Regime consolidates control in the western urban corridor, prioritizing defense of Damascus, Latakia, Tartus, and Homs. Donovian advisors integrate IADS and provide localized air defense and EW support. Limited counterattacks disrupt opposition advances, but sustainment shortfalls constrain deep operations. Chemical weapons remain coercive but are employed selectively to avoid broad NATO escalation. HaS expands governance in Raqqa/Deir ez‑Zor, conducts cross‑border fires to provoke NATO, and targets opposition cohesion in Aleppo/Idlib countryside.
Key MLCOA indicators:
- Increased radar mobility and strict emission control around Homs/Latakia/Tartus; short‑duration (≤30–60 min) illumination windows, decoy emitters, off‑axis sector scans; dispersed 2–3‑vehicle SA‑11/SA‑6 TEL packets using dummy masts and pre‑surveyed hide sites.
- Elevated Donovian advisor presence at sector operations centers and S‑300 sites; advisors embedded in IADS cells, Tor/Tunguska readiness drills, Russian‑language comms, A‑50 orbits offshore, and increased logistics shuttle tempo via Khmeimim.
- Regime artillery surges on MSRs and opposition assembly areas; pre‑positioned ammunition caches, increased BM‑21 firing density and counter‑battery activity; armor company‑sized spoiling pushes near Homs and Damascus suburbs with sub‑5‑minute displacement to alternate positions.
- HaS information operations amplifying NATO civilian‑casualty narratives through coordinated media drops and bot amplification; stepped‑up VBIED cycles in Aleppo/Idlib signaled by vehicle theft spikes, fertilizer/fuel precursor purchases theft/purchases, and workshop relocations.
Rapid Donovian escalation with direct air defense and fighter control, coordinated with regime preplanned chemical strikes on opposition concentrations and cross‑border SRBM/rocket attacks into Byzantaura staging hubs. IADS shifts to integrated ambush tactics against SEAD packages while cyber/EW targets NATO C2. HaS synchronizes mass casualty attacks to overwhelm humanitarian corridors and destabilize rear areas.
Key MDCOA indicators:
- Synchronous activation of S‑300 batteries with cross‑sector track data sharing; time‑correlated search/track windows, increased datalink chatter, unusual ELINT on 64N6/92N6 emissions, and hardened comms vans deployed to battery CPs.
- Forward movement of SA‑15/SA‑19 to chemical sites and C2 nodes; night convoys with temperature‑controlled trucks and heavy security, decon assets staged nearby, and restricted‑airspace/road closure notices along routes.
- Donovian air detachments increasing alert posture and CAP coverage over Latakia/Tartus; QRA reduced to 5‑minute, hot‑pit cycles, heavier A2A loadouts, tanker/A‑50 orbits established offshore, and NOTAMs expanding military airspace blocks.
- Coordinated propaganda framing NATO attacks as chemical strikes; synchronized state media/Telegram narratives, bot amplification, deepfake/forged imagery circulation, and concurrent refugee surges/CP throughput spikes near Gaziantep/Kilis.
Regime entrenches in Damascus–Latakia corridor; prioritizes IADS survival (mobility/EMCON), artillery-centric defense, selective chemical deterrence, and interdiction of opposition MSRs. Conducts local spoiling attacks; leverages Donovian advisors for C2 hardening.
Under this COA the regime accepts loss of depth in the east in exchange for preserving decisive terrain in the west. Air defenses operate on a shoot‑and‑scoot pattern, with S‑75/S‑125 belts protecting urban nodes and SA‑6/SA‑11 mobility creating pop‑up WEZ along likely NATO ingress routes. Fires shift to urban area denial and counter‑battery, using BM‑21 concentrations and heavy tube artillery to attrit opposition mass before it can cohere for a breakthrough.
Ground maneuver emphasizes elastic defense: armored battalion‑sized thrusts to disrupt opposition staging areas around Homs/Hama, followed by rapid displacement to pre‑surveyed secondary positions. Regime information ops frame NATO/HAF strikes as indiscriminate to erode Byzantaura’s tolerance for Article 5 costs while counterintelligence (CI) sweeps thin opposition underground networks in the Damascus belt. Chemical forces remain postured for signaling use only, with mixing gear forward‑staged but under central control to manage escalation.
Preplanned chemical strikes on opposition gatherings; concentrated armored thrust to relieve a besieged urban pocket; coordinated with Donovian EW masking and high-risk air defense engagements.
In this course the regime attempts to reset the operational tempo through shock and paralysis. A synchronized package opens with SVBIED deception against opposition C2, followed by limited chemical employment against a massed opposition formation outside a key urban center (e.g., Rastan/Talbiseh). Concurrently, two armored task groups punch relief corridors into an encircled pocket, exploiting temporary ISR degradation from Donovian EW masking to delay NATO cue‑to‑shoot timelines.
IADS moves from preservation to ambush: SA‑10 illumination within defended zones baits DEAD, while SA‑15/SA‑19 point defenses are pushed to chem and C2 nodes. The regime accepts higher losses to force a negotiated pause and compel NATO to reconsider risk tolerance. If the armored thrust achieves tactical breakout, follow‑on messaging seeks to portray momentum and fracture opposition unity.
Fighting withdrawal from exposed eastern garrisons; limited rapprochement with non‑HaS opposition to fix HaS; expanded information ops to fracture NATO coalition will.
Alternate paths include deliberate abandonment of far‑eastern outposts to shorten lines and reconcentrate on the Homs–Damascus axis, trading space for force preservation. The regime may also seek localized truces with select non‑HaS factions to isolate HaS, coupled with targeted amnesties to thin opposition ranks. Information ops target allied domestic audiences with narratives of civilian harm and sovereignty, attempting to split NATO consensus.
Maintain PVO umbrella in northern Hauran (S‑300PS + Tor/Tunguska), VMF task group presence (Moskva/escorts/Ropuchas) for AAW/ASW and logistics; ISR support and advisors; avoid direct air‑to‑air with NATO while contesting EM spectrum and narrative space.
Donovia prioritizes denial without decisive engagement. PVO maintains radar coverage arcs overlapping key regime nodes and coastal approaches, holding weapons‑tight unless NATO strikes threaten defended zones. VMF presence signals escalation control and secures the maritime sustainment bridge (fuel/cargo), while EW/cyber probes stress NATO C2 and datalinks to raise perception of risk. Advisors backstop regime C2/IADS integration and sharpen counter‑DEAD tactics.
Politically, Donovia works diplomatic channels to paint NATO action as overreach and to press for a ceasefire on terms that freeze current lines. The objective is endurance: keep the regime viable, impose attritional costs on opposition and NATO, and wait for coalition fatigue to open a negotiation window favorable to Donovia.
Authorize S‑300 weapons‑free inside defended zones; VMF anti‑ship demonstrations; fighter CAP push into buffer; limited strike on NATO forward nodes under pretext of self‑defense.
This path accepts short, sharp confrontations to dissuade further NATO action. S‑300 batteries are ordered weapons‑free against packages penetrating declared WEZ; Krivak/Tarantul elements conduct live‑fire drills and shadow NATO surface groups; VVS CAPs edge the buffer to complicate strike routing. Limited standoff strikes on lightly defended NATO nodes in Byzantaura or offshore assets could be attempted under a self‑defense narrative, calibrated to remain below a broader war threshold.
Strategically, Donovia seeks to establish a de facto no‑go band around regime heartland and demonstrate the costs of continued NATO enforcement. If NATO response is muted, Donovia expands the confrontation window; if not, it retrogrades to EM denial and maritime signaling while pressing hard diplomatically.
Indicators: S‑300 illumination trends; VMF missile exercises; Krivak activity near NATO pickets; disinformation pretexts.
Brokered ceasefire proposals to freeze lines; covert arms to regime special units; deniable proxy sabotage in Byzantaura.
Other options include a diplomatic surge to lock in a ceasefire favorable to regime survival; stepped‑up covert provisioning of precision munitions and EW kits to elite regime units; and the use of deniable actors to harass NATO logistics in Byzantaura, raising force protection costs without attributable escalation.
Fortify Raqqa/Deir ez‑Zor holdings; routine cross‑border rocket/raid activity; governance build‑out (police/tax) to secure revenue; targeted assassinations of non‑HaS rebel leaders.
HaS solidifies its proto‑state: katibas rotate through urban security and external raids, while administrative and economic security units lock down oil infrastructure and taxation. Daily IO frames HaS as the only effective governor, undercutting both regime and moderate opposition legitimacy. Cross‑border harassment fires and infiltration raids aim to fix NATO attention at the frontier and deter deep strikes into HaS heartland.
Operationally, HaS avoids decisive engagements, instead pursuing cumulative pressure: assassinations of rival commanders, interdiction of regime MSRs east of Homs, and coercive control of population centers to sustain recruitment and resources. This posture buys time to expand training, integrate foreign fighters, and improve IED/SVBIED quality.
Indicators: oil convoy movements; media releases on “services”; uptick in indirect fire across border; arrests of rival commanders.
¶ (TS) MDCOA — Storm and Seize Aleppo
HaS mass‑mobilizes into a brigade‑sized assault grouping (4–6 katibas plus technical, inghimasi, and mortar/rocket elements) to penetrate Aleppo’s outer perimeter and seize decisive districts and junctions. Preparatory actions include weeks of clandestine caching inside the city, targeted assassinations of local security leaders, and UAV ISR mapping of regime checkpoints and choke points. The assault opens with sequential SVBIED breaching along two axes (likely north/east), supported by ATGM belts to defeat regime armor and a MANPADS ring to complicate close air support. Priority objectives include the Sheikh Najjar industrial zone, nodes along the Castello/M5 approaches, and regime C2/media sites to shape the information environment.
Follow‑on phases isolate garrisons, establish blocking positions to prevent relief along the Hama road, and create layered urban defenses (IED belts, sniper/OP nets, and counter‑attack kill sacks) to hold core neighborhoods. HaS installs immediate governance (police/tax courts) to signal permanence and leverages human terrain to constrain NATO fires through ROE and collateral‑damage risk. If regime counter‑attacks stall in the suburbs, HaS attempts to widen control to the airport/Nayrab corridor and force a negotiated pause recognizing HaS control within the city.
Infiltration of regime lines to capture chem assets; operational pause to regroup under external pressure; increased hostage‑taking for leverage.
Alternate paths include covert campaigns to penetrate regime chem security for leverage, declaring an operational pause to rearm and reconstitute after major losses, or elevating hostage‑taking to trade space for time and compel local withdrawals without decisive fights.
- Will Donovia directly employ advanced IADS or combat aircraft in defense of regime C2/chemical sites?
- Where are the current locations and movement patterns of SA‑10/SA‑11 batteries and their C2 nodes within the JOA?
- What is the disposition and readiness of regime chemical weapons (stockpiles, mixing capability, delivery systems)?
- What are HaS plans/timelines for cross‑border strikes into Byzantaura and expansion toward Aleppo/Idlib?
- Which regime sustainment hubs and LOCs (Latakia–Damascus corridor) are critical vulnerabilities for interdiction?
- What are the triggers for regime/Donovian escalation to direct engagement with NATO forces?
- Will HaS mass forces to storm and seize Aleppo within the next 30 days? If so, along which axes and what decisive objectives?
- Where are regime armored reserves (company/battalion groups) staging for counterattacks along the Hama road and Aleppo approaches?
- What are Donovian VMF rules of engagement and posture for coastal strike/sea denial (e.g., Kalibr employment) and maritime blockade?
- Where and when will chemical mixing/transport occur (convoy windows, routes, transshipment points) for potential operational use?
- What are the critical nodes and timings in the Khmeimim/Latakia sustainment pipeline (oiler offloads, crane availability, railhead throughput)?
- What are the indicators of an S‑300 ROE shift to weapons‑free and of sector C2 resiliency (redundant fiber/microwave links, CP dispersal)?
- Who comprises the regime National Command Authority and crisis cell; where are they located; what are protection, communications, and succession mechanisms?
- Which command and control nodes (palace/SOC/alt‑CPs, microwave/fiber trunks, relay sites) are decisive for regime control, and which removals will fragment regime C2?
- Which elite formations and security services are regime survival guarantors (e.g., Republican Guard, 4th Armored, Intelligence Directorates); what are their loyalty/cohesion, pay cycles, and leadership fault lines?
- What financial lifelines sustain regime operations (central bank vaults, cash couriers, foreign exchange conduits, smuggling routes), and what are payroll/fuel disbursement timelines by AO?
- Which media/IO and civil control nodes (state broadcaster, microwave uplinks, cellular cores, censorship units) enable regime narrative control and mobilization?
- Which energy and fuel chokepoints (refineries, fuel farms, critical substations/transformers, pipeline manifolds) sustain Damascus belt and armored/mech units, and what is redundancy/repair time?
- Where are leadership safe houses, continuity bunkers, and VIP mobility assets (Mi‑8/VIP flights, hardened motorcades); what are standard routes, timings, and decoys?
- What triggers and influencer nodes (tribal/clerical/business networks) could precipitate a defection cascade in military/police units by sector?
Supporting Intelligence Requirements (IR):
- Identification of EW/cyber units supporting IADS; frequency plans and emission schedules.
- Order of battle updates for elite ground units around Damascus, Homs, and Tiyas/Shayrat.
- Confirmation of foreign fighter pipelines and financing nodes supporting HaS.
- Detailed dispositions of regime armored reserves near Homs/Aleppo, including staging lots, refuel/rearm points, and movement routes.
- Identification of HaS katiba aggregation areas, foreign fighter arrival points, and training camps in Aleppo/Idlib countryside.
- Procurement patterns for SVBIED/IED precursors (ammonium nitrate, fuel, detonators), vehicle thefts, and armor kit workshops.
- Chemical munitions transport indicators: contractor rosters, vehicle plates, convoy SOPs, decon support, and route clearances.
- VMF ship loadouts (AAW/AShM), oiler schedules, tug/harbor asset availability, and Tartus/Latakia port work cycles.
- A‑50 orbit schedules, tanker anchor areas, and VVS CAP routing for coastal A2AD coverage.
- S‑300 battery missile counts, spare launcher status, reload timelines, and transloader locations.
- Tor/Tunguska point‑defense coverage around S‑300 and chemical/C2 nodes; readiness drills and displacement patterns.
- Sector C2 nodes (SOC, microwave towers, fiber junctions), backup power, and SATCOM fallbacks with frequency plans.
- Civilian displacement/refugee flow indicators along Aleppo/Gaziantep lines; humanitarian corridor opening/closure patterns.
- HaS financing flows (oil, taxation, hawala, crypto) and front companies; key facilitators and couriers.
- Named IO narratives/botnets supporting regime/Donovia/HaS; media outlets likely to seed pretexts for escalation.
- Regime National Command Authority roster, crisis cell composition, meeting rhythms, and protection details.
- Location and layout of palace/SOC/alternate CPs; microwave/fiber relay maps and field‑expedient CP kits.
- Republican Guard and 4th Armored leadership chain, loyalty/cohesion indicators, pay cycles, and disciplinary trends.
- Central bank vault locations, cash depots, courier networks, payroll disbursement points, and fuel allocation schedules.
- State broadcaster HQ, satellite/microwave uplinks, cellular core (MSC/HLR) and NOCs; control rooms and backup sites.
- Electrical substations/transformers powering Damascus C2/media nodes; repair crews, spares, and restoration timelines.
- Pipeline manifolds, fuel farms, and valve stations sustaining Damascus belt and armored/mech units; redundancy diagrams.
- Leadership safehouses, continuity bunkers, tunnels/underground access; VIP motorcade garages and helipad locations.
- VIP mobility patterns (Mi‑8/VIP flights, motorcade routes/timings); decoy use and security SOPs.
- Tribal/clerical/business influencer networks with leverage over unit leadership; potential defection facilitators.
¶ 4. (TS) Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) and Targeted Areas of Interest (TAIs)
- NAI‑01: Damascus sector operations center and fiber/microwave relays.
- NAI‑02: Homs S‑300 sector (battalion revetments, radar pads, missile magazines).
- NAI‑03: Latakia/Tartus coastal IADS belt and Tartus Naval Base logistics piers.
- NAI‑04: Tiyas (T4) and Shayrat Air Base perimeters, dispersal shelters, POL nodes.
- NAI‑05: Raqqa and Deir ez‑Zor HaS HQ compounds and media/IO nodes.
- NAI‑06: Gaziantep/Kilis border rocket/artillery launch boxes used for cross‑border fires.
- NAI‑07: Aleppo approaches (Sheikh Najjar, Castello Road, Nayrab corridor) checkpoints, utility nodes, and C2.
- NAI‑08: Hama road junctions and Aleppo ring road interchanges suitable for blocking/relief operations.
- NAI‑09: Khmeimim Air Base sustainment (oiler/cargo ramps, POL farms, munitions storage, flightline cranes).
- NAI‑10: Damascus sector fiber/microwave trunks and backup power nodes feeding IADS/SOC.
- NAI‑11: Suspected chemical depots/transshipment near Homs/Masyaf and along the Latakia corridor.
- NAI‑12: Donovian S‑300 battery CPs and comms vans; datalink relay vehicles and antenna farms.
- NAI‑13: HaS training camps/workshops near Raqqa/Tabqa and Idlib countryside (VBIED fabrication zones).
- NAI‑14: Tartus Naval Base piers/drydock, crane operations, and railhead/warehouse complex.
- NAI‑15: MSR M5 bridge/culvert chokepoints used by mobile SAMs and regime armor columns.
- NAI‑16: Presidential/cabinet compounds and crisis cell meeting sites; alternate command posts and safe rooms.
- NAI‑17: State SOC/alt‑SOC facilities in Damascus, with associated microwave/fiber relay clusters.
- NAI‑18: Republican Guard and 4th Armored HQs, barracks, armored reserve parks, and railheads.
- NAI‑19: Central bank vaults, treasury cash depots, MoF disbursement hubs, and cash courier hubs.
- NAI‑20: State broadcaster HQ, satellite/microwave uplinks, cellular core (MSC/HLR) and telecom NOCs.
- NAI‑21: Electrical substations/transformers powering C2/media quarters and security districts in Damascus.
- NAI‑22: Fuel farms and pipeline manifold/valve stations sustaining Damascus belt and heavy formations.
- NAI‑23: VIP mobility nodes (Mezze VIP ramps, helipads), motorcade garages, and standard/probable routes.
- NAI‑24: Leadership safehouse districts, continuity bunkers, tunnel portals, and underground access points.
- TAI‑A: Mobile SA‑11/SA‑6 convoy choke points along MSR M5 and coastal highway.
- TAI‑B: Chemical weapons suspected depots/hardstands in western Hauran (strike‑time sensitive).
- TAI‑C: Donovian logistics offload sites in Latakia/Tartus (cranes, warehouses, railheads).
- TAI‑D: HaS heavy weapons parks east of Raqqa near oil infrastructure.
- TAI‑E: Aleppo urban junctions (Castello, Sheikh Najjar gates) to block HaS penetration and isolate sectors.
- TAI‑F: Regime armored reserve staging areas south of Aleppo/Hama road for interdiction during counterattack setup.
- TAI‑G: Khmeimim POL offload points and oiler piers (time‑sensitive maritime interdiction).
- TAI‑H: S‑300 sector C2 relay/microwave sites enabling cross‑sector data‑sharing and ROE shifts.
- TAI‑I: HaS ATGM/MANPADS cache sites along Aleppo approaches and ring road feeders.
- TAI‑J: VBIED workshops and logistics hubs in Idlib/Aleppo countryside supporting mass‑casualty operations.
- TAI‑K: Microwave/fiber junctions and relay farms that knit together national/sector C2.
- TAI‑L: SOC and alternate CP compounds; relocatable CP convoys and comms vans.
- TAI‑M: Republican Guard/4th Armored reserve parks, motor pools, and railheads for rapid interdiction.
- TAI‑N: State broadcaster uplinks and cellular core switches/NOCs enabling narrative control and mobilization.
- TAI‑O: Central bank vault evacuation routes and cash courier choke points.
- TAI‑P: Critical electrical substations/transformers feeding C2 and media nodes (non‑kinetic/kinetic options).
- TAI‑Q: VIP mobility nodes (Mezze VIP ramps, helipads) to interdict/capture leadership movement.
- TAI‑R: Pipeline manifold/valve stations that sustain Damascus fuel distribution.
- Space/IMINT: Daily passes to map IADS relocations, airfield activity, and depot signatures.
- RQ‑4/U‑2: Broad‑area ISR for IADS, LOCs, and airfields; change detection on NAIs 01–04.
- RC‑135 (Rivet Joint/Combat Sent): Emitter characterization for S‑300/SA‑11; geolocation for DEAD queues.
- E‑8C JSTARS: Ground MTI on MSR M5/coastal highway to track mobile SAMs and logistics.
- MQ‑9: Pattern‑of‑life over NAIs 05–06; dynamic target prosecution on TAIs A–D.
- AWACS (E‑3G): Air picture; cueing for CAP/SEAD packages, track pop‑up threats.
- Cyber/EW: Access reconnaissance against sector C2; spectrum survey for HAVE QUICK/SATURN deconfliction.
- P‑8A/Maritime Patrol: Maritime ISR of Tartus/Latakia approaches, VMF surface group tracking, AIS correlation.
- SOF/SR Teams: Route recon on Aleppo approaches/Hama road, VBIED workshop signatures, and NAI‑07/08 validation.
- OSINT Cell: Real‑time media/Telegram exploitation for mobilization/propaganda indicators and port operations.
- HUMINT Networks: Recruited regime/security/finance/media insiders; driver/bodyguard sources; defection‑prone influencers.
- SIGINT (Strategic/COMEXT): Leadership comms, microwave/fiber relays, handset geolocation, and CP datalinks.
- PIR 1 → RC‑135, U‑2, cyber accesses on sector C2; HUMINT reporting.
- PIR 2 → RQ‑4 change detection; JSTARS MTI on MSRs; RC‑135 ELINT.
- PIR 3 → IMINT of suspected depots; SIGINT on movement orders; MQ‑9 close‑in surveillance.
- PIR 4 → MQ‑9 over Raqqa/DeZ; HUMINT/OSINT on IO and mobilization.
- PIR 5 → JSTARS MTI/IMINT on Latakia–Damascus; logistics SIGINT.
- PIR 6 → ELINT on Donovian C2 nets; AWACS alert posture changes; HUMINT diplomatic/military sources.
- PIR 7 → MQ‑9 over Aleppo NAIs; HUMINT sources; OSINT on mobilization narratives; JSTARS MTI for massing.
- PIR 8 → JSTARS MTI along Hama road/Aleppo ring; IMINT of staging lots; HUMINT on fuel/ammo distribution.
- PIR 9 → P‑8A maritime ISR at Tartus/Latakia; ELINT on VMF radars; AIS/OSINT shipping and port logs.
- PIR 10 → IMINT on chem depots/transshipment; SIGINT movement orders; HUMINT contractor networks; RC‑135.
- PIR 11 → IMINT/MTI at Khmeimim/Tartus cranes/railheads; OSINT port manifests; HUMINT stevedore/rail contacts.
- PIR 12 → RC‑135 ELINT on 64N6/92N6; cyber access to sector C2; IMINT of CP dispersal and microwave sites.
- PIR 13 → HUMINT inner‑circle; MQ‑9/IMINT on compounds; SIGINT leadership nets; cyber access to security comms; OSINT on appearances.
- PIR 14 → IMINT of SOC/alt‑CPs and relay farms; RC‑135/SIGINT on datalinks; cyber mapping of fiber; JSTARS for CP convoy movement.
- PIR 15 → HUMINT in RG/4th; IMINT of unit assembly; JSTARS MTI on reserve staging; OSINT on leadership changes; SIGINT morale/comms.
- PIR 16 → HUMINT finance networks; cyber on MoF/central bank systems; IMINT of vaults/courier hubs; OSINT FX/commodity signals.
- PIR 17 → IMINT of broadcaster/uplinks and telecom cores; cyber/NOC access; SIGINT on microwave; OSINT narrative propagation.
- PIR 18 → IMINT of substations/pipelines; HUMINT maintenance crews; OSINT outage reports; JSTARS MTI on tanker/fuel convoys.
- PIR 19 → MQ‑9 pattern‑of‑life on VIP nodes; HUMINT drivers/bodyguards; SIGINT handset geoloc; IMINT helipad/ramp activity.
- PIR 20 → HUMINT influencer networks; OSINT sentiment/defection chatter; SIGINT on coordination; CI reporting on unit cohesion.
¶ c. (TS) Dissemination and Rhythm
- INTSUM daily 1800Z; SITMAP refresh with IADS overlays 2×/day.
- Immediate FLASH reporting for S‑300 illumination, chemical movement, or cross‑border launch prep.
¶ 6. (TS) Intelligence Gaps and Assumptions
- Exact count and readiness of S‑300 launchers and missiles; assumption: at least two batteries fully mission capable at Homs and Latakia.
- Confirmed locations of chemical stockpiles and mixing units; assumption: dispersed near major SAM/C2 nodes to complicate strike planning.
- Degree of Donovian rules of engagement for direct fires against NATO aircraft; assumption: localized engagement authorized within defended zones.
- HaS external resupply and financing channels; assumption: resilient networks via eastern neighbors.
Mitigation: prioritize multi‑INT fusion on NAIs 01–04; expand HUMINT access; maintain continuous ELINT watch on sector radars.
¶ 7. (TS) Risk to Force and Counterintelligence
- Air: High‑end SAM engagement zones around Homs/Latakia/Tartus; pop‑up mobile SAM ambushes; GPS/SATCOM jamming.
- Ground (SOF/Advisors): VBIED/IED threats in Aleppo/Idlib periphery; regime/HaS informant networks.
- CI: Regime/HaS penetration attempts against partner forces; OPSEC vulnerabilities via social media. Enforce strict emissions control and need‑to‑know on planned strikes.
- SITEMP with IADS sectors, SAM WEZ, and chemical risk overlays.
- IADS emitter library (threat guide) and current MGRS grid list for active sites.
- Target System Analysis (TSA) for Latakia/Tartus logistics and Damascus C2.
- PIR dashboard and NAI/TAI tracker for the JOC.
Haurani Air Force (HAF) is degraded but retains pockets of combat power centered on Damascus and the western corridor, with strike, fighter, training, and rotary elements dispersed for survivability. Donovian advisors likely augment air defense integration and limited fighter employment. Sortie generation is constrained by maintenance and spares.
| Unit |
Unit Type |
Aircraft |
Base/Location |
Remarks |
| 697 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑29 |
Al‑Sheen (Sayqal) AB |
|
| 699 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑29 |
Al‑Sheen (Sayqal) AB |
|
| 702 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑29 |
Al‑Sheen (Sayqal) AB |
|
| 21 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑29 |
Aleppo International |
Periodic presence |
| 675 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑23 |
Shayrat AB |
|
| 695 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑23 |
An Nasiriya AB |
|
| 651 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑23 |
Dumayr AB |
|
| 54 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑23 |
Marj Ruhayyil AB |
|
| 77 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑23 |
Marj Ruhayyil AB |
|
| 825 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑23 |
Al Qusayr AB |
|
| 12 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑21 |
Tabqa AB |
|
| 8 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑21 |
Deir ez‑Zor AB |
|
| 679 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑21 |
Hamah AB |
|
| 680 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑21 |
Hamah AB |
|
| 678 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑21 |
Kweiras AB |
|
| 945 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑21 |
Khalkhalah AB |
|
| 946 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
MiG‑21 |
Khalkhalah AB |
|
| 1 Squadron |
Interceptor Squadron |
MiG‑25 |
Tiyas (T4) AB |
|
| 826 Squadron |
Fighter Squadron |
Su‑27 |
Al Qusayr AB |
|
| Unit |
Unit Type |
Aircraft |
Base/Location |
Remarks |
| 819 Squadron |
Bomber Squadron |
Su‑24M |
Tiyas (T4) AB |
Periodic to Shayrat AB |
| 623 Squadron |
Attack Squadron |
Su‑22 |
Dumayr AB |
|
| 827 Squadron |
Attack Squadron |
Su‑22 |
Tiyas (T4) AB |
|
| 677 Squadron |
Attack Squadron |
Su‑22 |
Shayrat AB |
|
| 685 Squadron |
Attack Squadron |
Su‑22 |
Shayrat AB |
|
| Unit |
Unit Type |
Aircraft |
Base/Location |
Remarks |
| 2 Squadron |
Training Squadron |
L‑39 |
Abu Ad Duhor AB |
|
| 314 Squadron |
Training Squadron |
L‑39 |
Abu Ad Duhor AB |
|
| 2 Squadron (Det) |
Training Detachment |
L‑39 |
Jirah AB |
Detachment |
| 943 Squadron |
Training Squadron |
L‑39 |
Kweiras AB |
|
| 253 Squadron |
Training Squadron |
L‑39 |
Aleppo International |
|
| Unit |
Unit Type |
Aircraft |
Base/Location |
Remarks |
| 522 Squadron |
Airlift Squadron |
Il‑76 |
Damascus‑Mezze AB / Damascus Intl |
|
| 565 Squadron |
Transport Squadron |
Yak‑40 |
Damascus‑Mezze AB |
|
| 585 Squadron |
VIP Transport Squadron |
Tu‑134 |
Damascus‑Mezze AB |
|
| Unit |
Unit Type |
Aircraft |
Base/Location |
Remarks |
| 255 Squadron |
Helicopter Squadron |
Mi‑8 |
Taftanaz AB |
|
| 253 Squadron |
Helicopter Squadron |
Mi‑8 |
Taftanaz AB |
|
| 525 Squadron |
Helicopter Squadron |
Mi‑8 |
Marj As Sultan AB |
|
| 537 Squadron |
Helicopter Squadron |
Mi‑8 |
Marj As Sultan AB |
|
| 412 Squadron |
Helicopter Squadron |
Mi‑8 |
Damascus‑Mezze AB / Hama AB |
|
| 909 Squadron |
Helicopter Squadron |
Mi‑8 |
Damascus‑Mezze AB / Hama AB |
|
| 765 Squadron |
Helicopter Squadron |
Mi‑8 |
Kweiras AB / Aleppo International |
|
| 532 Squadron |
Helicopter Squadron |
Mi‑8 |
Quabr as Sitt AB |
|
| Baseflight |
Helicopter Flight |
Mi‑8 |
Tabqa AB |
|
| 4th Flying Training Squadron |
Training Squadron |
Mi‑8 |
Minakh AB |
|
| 577 Squadron |
Light Helicopter Squadron |
SA‑342 |
Damascus‑Mezze AB / Marj Ruhayyil AB |
|
| 976 Squadron |
Light Helicopter Squadron |
SA‑342 |
Damascus‑Mezze AB / Marj Ruhayyil AB |
|
| 767 Squadron |
Attack Helicopter Squadron |
Mi‑24 |
Marj Ruhayyil AB |
|
- Damascus Intl (DAM) – Fighters (MiG‑29); integrated with Damascus‑Mezze support
- Tiyas (T4) AB – Su‑24, Su‑25, MiG‑29 dispersal, IADS coverage; chemical risk vicinity
- Shayrat AB – Su‑24, Su‑22; hardened shelters; SAM point defense
- Hama AB – MiG‑23, Su‑25, Gazelle det; artillery support nearby
- Khalkhalah AB – MiG‑21; SE sector air defense tie‑in
- Marj Ruhayyil AB – Su‑22, Gazelle; regime rotary/C2 hub
- Marj As Sultan AB – Mi‑8; rotary staging east of Damascus
- Aleppo Int’l – L‑39ZA, Mi‑8; periodic HaS pressure
- Deir ez‑Zor AB – Mi‑8; contested logistics node
- Khmeimim/Latakia – Donovian presence; HAF access assessed limited/episodic
- Damascus‑Mezze AB – Airlift/VIP (Il‑76, Yak‑40, Tu‑134), Gazelle, Mi‑8
- Quabr as Sitt / Minakh / Kweiras / Jirah / Abu Ad Duhor / An Nasiriya / Dumayr / Al‑Sheen (Sayqal) / Al Qusayr / Taftanaz – as listed above
Haurani Army retains a core of armored/mechanized divisions and elite formations around Damascus, Homs/Hama corridor, and key MSRs. Units are attrited and cadre-heavy; combat power concentrates on artillery and defensive strongpoints. Design mirrors legacy Haurani Army structure (circa 2013).
¶ a. (TS) Corps and Divisions
| Formation |
Type |
HQ/Area |
Subordinate Brigades (notional) |
Remarks |
| Republican Guard |
Elite Mech/Armored Division |
Damascus |
RG Mech Bde (x2); RG Armored Bde; RG Artillery Group |
Regime protection, urban defense |
| 4th Armored Division |
Armored Division |
Damascus / Western AO |
Armored Bde (x2); Mechanized Bde; Div Arty Group |
Elite; primary counterattack force |
| 1st Armored Division |
Armored Division |
Southern AO (Dar’a/Quneitra) |
Armored Bde; Mechanized Bde; Div Arty Group |
Southern defensive anchor |
| 3rd Armored Division |
Armored Division |
Al Qutayfah (NE Damascus) |
Armored Bde; Mechanized Bde; Div Arty Group; 155th Arty Regt |
Guards critical MSRs |
| 10th Mechanized Division |
Mechanized Division |
Damascus Countryside |
Mechanized Bde (x2); Armored Bde; Div Arty Group |
Area security, reserve |
| 11th Armored Division |
Armored Division |
Homs / Hama Corridor |
Armored Bde; Mechanized Bde; Div Arty Group |
Central corridor defense |
| 17th Reserve Division |
Reserve/Composite Division |
Raqqa / Deir ez‑Zor |
Mixed Bn Groups; Reserve Arty |
Oil infrastructure/security |
| 14th Special Forces Division |
SOF/Light Infantry Division |
Detachments: Aleppo, Homs |
SF Brigades (x3) |
Raids, urban clearance |
| 7th Armored Division |
Armored Division |
Central Desert (Palmyra/Tiyas corridor) |
Armored Bdes (x2); Mech Bde; Div Arty Group; 7th Arty Bde |
Mobile desert reserve |
| 5th Armored Division |
Armored Division |
South (Damascus/Golan sector) |
17th/96th Arm Bde; 112th Mech Bde; Div Arty Bde |
|
| 6th Armored Division |
Armored Division |
South (Damascus approaches) |
12th/98th Arm Bde; 11th Mech Bde; Div Arty Bde |
|
| 8th Armored Division |
Armored Division |
South (Damascus outskirts) |
62nd/65th Arm Bde; 32nd Mech Bde; Div Arty Bde |
|
| 9th Armored Division |
Armored Division |
Southern AO |
43rd/91st Arm Bde; 52nd Mech Bde; Div Arty Bde |
|
| 7th Mechanized Division |
Mechanized Division |
Southern AO |
58th/68th Arm Bde; 78th Mech Bde; Div Arty Bde |
|
| 4th Mechanized Division |
Mechanized Division |
North West (Lebanese border) |
1st Arm Bde; 61st/89th Mech Bde; Div Arty Bde |
|
| 2nd Reserve Armored Division |
Reserve Armored Division |
Aleppo AO |
14th/15th Arm Bde; 19th Mech Bde |
|
| 12th Cadre Motorized Infantry Division |
Cadre Motorized Division |
Aleppo AO |
Cadre Arm Inf Bde; Cadre Mot Inf Bde (x2) |
|
| 13th Cadre Motorized Infantry Division |
Cadre Motorized Division |
Aleppo AO |
Cadre Arm Inf Bde; Cadre Mot Inf Bde (x2) |
|
¶ b. (TS) Independent Brigades and Regiments
| Unit |
Type |
AO/Location |
Equipment |
Remarks |
| Republican Guard Brigades |
Elite Mech/Armored |
Damascus |
T‑72/T‑55; BMP‑1/2 |
Urban defense/C2 security |
| SRBM Missile Brigade |
Tactical Ballistic Missile |
Damascus Periphery |
SRBM (Tochka/Scarab est.) |
Strategic fires, deterrence |
| Coastal Defense Group |
Coastal Defense |
Latakia/Tartus |
Artillery/ATGM/AAA |
Maritime LOC security |
| Counter‑insurgency Bn Groups |
Light/Composite |
Homs/Hama/Idlib belts |
4x4, technicals, MRAP |
Area security, checkpoints |
¶ c. (TS) Artillery and Rocket Forces
| Formation |
Type |
AO/Location |
Equipment |
Remarks |
| Corps Artillery Brigades |
Tube/Rocket Artillery |
Damascus, Homs, Aleppo sectors |
122/130/152mm; BM‑21 |
Massed fires; priority to urban fronts |
| Division Artillery Groups |
Organic Divisional Fires |
Per division AO |
122mm D‑30; 2S1/2S3 (limited) |
Attrited; ammo constraints |
| Heavy Rocket Battalion |
MRL |
Damascus sector |
BM‑27/long‑range MRL (assessed) |
Counter‑battery/area denial |
| Formation |
Type |
AO/Location |
Equipment |
Remarks |
| Air Defense Brigades |
IADS Components |
Damascus/Latakia/Homs belts |
SA‑2/3/5/6/11; SA‑15/19 (point) |
Integrated with national IADS |
| AAA Regiments |
Point/Area Defense |
Major bases/cities |
ZU‑23; Shilka; MANPADS |
Short‑range air defense |
¶ e. (TS) SOF and Security Elements
| Unit |
Type |
AO/Location |
Role |
Remarks |
| 14th Special Forces Division |
SOF/Light Infantry |
Nationwide detachments |
Raids, clearance, direct action |
Supports elite ops |
| Military Intelligence/SS Units |
Internal Security |
Damascus, urban centers |
Counter‑subversion, CI |
Regime control mechanisms |
- [1st SF Regiment] - Damascus (Darayya/Qaboun)
- [2nd SF Regiment] - Homs (Al Waer/Rastan)
- [3rd SF Regiment] - Aleppo (urban sectors)
- [4th SF Regiment] (–) - Idlib (Jisr al‑Shughur/Ghab)
- [5th SF Regiment] - Hama (Salamiyah Road)
- [6th SF Regiment] - Qalamoun (An Nasiriya/Adra)
- [7th SF Regiment] - Latakia Mts (Jabal al‑Akrad)
- [8th SF Regiment] (–) - Deir ez‑Zor (urban/perimeter)
- [9th SF Regiment] (–) - Raqqa (Ain Issa/Tabqa axis)
- [10th SF Regiment] - Quneitra (front)
- [11th SF Regiment] - Dar’a (Nawa/Jasim)
- [14th Commando Division] - Detachments: Damascus, Homs, Aleppo
¶ f. (TS) Paramilitary and Auxiliaries
| Formation |
Type |
AO/Location |
Role |
Remarks |
| National Defense Forces (NDF) |
Militia/Local Defense |
Urban/peri‑urban west |
Checkpoints, hold terrain |
Variable quality |
| Foreign Auxiliaries (assessed) |
Irregular |
Western corridor |
Advisory/combat support |
Limited, deniable |
Notes:
- Brigade counts and exact designations are notional; mirrors legacy Haurani Army for 2013‑era.
- Concentration of capable maneuver: Damascus environs, Homs/Hama corridor, coastal LOCs. Eastern sectors rely on reserves/paramilitaries.
-
[Republican Guard Division] - Damascus
- [105th Mechanized Brigade] - Damascus
- [101st Mechanized Battalion] (-) - Darayya
- [102nd Mechanized Battalion] (–) - Jobar
- [103rd Tank Battalion] (-) - Qaboun
- [104th Armored Brigade] - Damascus
- [104th Tank Battalion] - Adra Industrial
- [105th Tank Battalion] (+) - Qaboun Perimeter
- [106th Motorized Infantry Battalion] (-) - Ring Road (SE)
- [Republican Guard Artillery Group] - Damascus
- [191st Howitzer Battalion] - Mazzeh
- [192nd Rocket Battalion] (+) - Kafr Sousa
-
[4th Armored Division] - Damascus / Western AO
- [40th Armored Brigade] - Dar’a Corridor
- [201st Tank Battalion] (-) - Izra’
- [202nd Tank Battalion] (-) - Sheikh Maskeen
- [203rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion] (–) - Dar’a City (urban)
- [41st Armored Brigade] - Quneitra Axis
- [204th Tank Battalion] - Khan Arnabah
- [205th Tank Battalion] - Kanaker
- [206th Reconnaissance Battalion] - Sasa’
- [42nd Mechanized Brigade] - Rif Damascus
- [207th Mechanized Battalion] (-) - Harasta
- [208th Mechanized Battalion] (-) - Douma
- [209th Anti‑Tank Battalion] - Adra Junction
- [Division Artillery Group] - Rif Damascus
- [291st Howitzer Battalion] - Qatana
- [292nd MRL Battalion] (+) - Kiswah
-
[1st Armored Division] - Southern AO (Dar’a/Quneitra)
- [61st Armored Brigade] - Nawa Sector
- [301st Tank Battalion] (–) - Nawa (urban)
- [302nd Tank Battalion] (-) - Jasim
- [303rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Tasil
- [63rd Mechanized Brigade] - As Suwayda Edge
- [158th Armored Brigade] - Southern Sector Reserve
- [307th Tank Battalion] - Nawa South
- [308th Tank Battalion] (-) - Jasim South
- [309th Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Tasil Spur
- [165th Armored Brigade] - Southern MSR Security
- [310th Tank Battalion] - Izra’ South Road
- [311th Tank Battalion] - Sheikh Maskeen East
- [312th Mechanized Infantry Battalion] (-) - As Suwayda Edge
- [304th Mechanized Battalion] - Al Qrayya
- [305th Mechanized Battalion] - Al Ghariyah
- [306th Tank Battalion] (-) - Izra’
- [Division Artillery Group] - Izra’
- [391st Howitzer Battalion] - Izra’
- [392nd BM‑21 Battalion] - Namer
-
[3rd Armored Division] - Al Qutayfah (NE Damascus)
-
[65th Armored Brigade] - Dumayr / Ad Dumayr
- [401st Tank Battalion] (-) - Ad Dumayr
- [402nd Tank Battalion] - Ad Dumayr East
- [403rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion] (-) - Marj as Sultan
-
[81st Mechanized Brigade] - An Nasiriya
- [404th Mechanized Battalion] - An Nasiriya
- [405th Mechanized Battalion] (-) - Qalamoun Villages
- [406th Tank Battalion] (-) - An Nasiriya Rail
-
[Division Artillery Group] - Adra / Qalamoun
-
[155th Artillery Regiment] - Al Qutayfah
- [781st Howitzer Battalion] - Al Qutayfah Barracks
- [782nd MRL Battalion] - Al Qutayfah Range
-
[65th Mechanized Brigade] - Al Qutayfah Sector
- [407th Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Qutayfah South
- [408th Mechanized Infantry Battalion] (-) - Qutayfah East
- [409th Tank Battalion] - Qutayfah North
- [491st Howitzer Battalion] (-) - Adra
- [492nd MRL Battalion] - An Nasiriya
-
[10th Mechanized Division] - Damascus Countryside
- [58th Mechanized Brigade] - Qatana / Sahnaya
- [501st Mechanized Battalion] (-) - Sahnaya
- [502nd Mechanized Battalion] (-) - Qatana
- [503rd Tank Battalion] (-) - Qatana West
- [85th Mechanized Brigade] - Kiswah / Khan ash‑Shih
- [504th Mechanized Battalion] (–) - Khan ash‑Shih (urban)
- [505th Mechanized Battalion] (-) - Kiswah
- [506th Reconnaissance Battalion] (-) - Deir Khabiyah
- [Division Artillery Group] - Qatana Belt
- [591st Howitzer Battalion] (-) - Qatana
- [592nd BM‑21 Battalion] - Sasa’
-
[5th Armored Division] - South (Damascus/Golan sector)
-
[17th Armored Brigade] - Southern Golan
- [171st Tank Battalion] - Khan Arnabah South
- [172nd Tank Battalion] - Quneitra Gate
- [173rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Breika
-
[96th Armored Brigade] - Damascus Periphery (SW)
- [174th Tank Battalion] - Sasa’ Ridge
- [175th Tank Battalion] - Kiswah South
- [176th Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Deir Khabiyah
-
[112th Mechanized Brigade] - Golan Rear
- [177th Mechanized Battalion] - Izra’ West
- [178th Mechanized Battalion] - Nawa Spur
- [179th Tank Battalion] - Sheikh Maskeen South
-
[Division Artillery Brigade] - South Sector
- [181st Howitzer Battalion] - Nawa Belt
- [182nd MRL Battalion] - Khan Arnabah Rear
-
[6th Armored Division] - South (Damascus approaches)
-
[12th Armored Brigade] - Darayya Plain
- [191st Tank Battalion] (-) - Darayya West
- [192nd Tank Battalion] (-) - Muadamiya
- [193rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Qatana Road
-
[98th Armored Brigade] - Kiswah / Kanaker
- [194th Tank Battalion] (-) - Kanaker
- [195th Tank Battalion] (-) - Khan ash‑Shih
- [196th Mechanized Infantry Battalion] (-) - Kiswah East
-
[11th Mechanized Brigade] - Outer Damascus
- [197th Mechanized Battalion] (-) - Harasta Fringe
- [198th Mechanized Battalion] (-) - Douma Fringe
- [199th Tank Battalion] (-) - Adra Spur
-
[Division Artillery Brigade] - Damascus Approaches
- [283rd Howitzer Battalion] (-) - Qatana
- [284th MRL Battalion] (-) - Kiswah
-
[8th Armored Division] - South (Damascus outskirts)
-
[62nd Armored Brigade] - Sahnaya/Qatana
- [311st Tank Battalion] - Sahnaya
- [312nd Tank Battalion] - Qatana West
- [313rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Ashrafiyat
-
[65th Armored Brigade] - Dar’a Road
- [314th Tank Battalion] - Ghabagheb
- [315th Tank Battalion] - Izra’ North
- [316th Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Namer Line
-
[32nd Mechanized Brigade] - Rear Sector
- [317th Mechanized Battalion] - Qatana Belt
- [318th Mechanized Battalion] - Jdeidet Artouz
- [319th Tank Battalion] - Sasa’ Junction
-
[Division Artillery Brigade] - South Outskirts
- [385th Howitzer Battalion] - Qatana
- [386th MRL Battalion] - Sahnaya
-
[9th Armored Division] - Southern AO
-
[43rd Armored Brigade] - Nawa / Jasim
- [321st Tank Battalion] - Nawa
- [322nd Tank Battalion] - Jasim
- [323rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Tasil
-
[91st Armored Brigade] - As Suwayda Edge
- [324th Tank Battalion] - Izra’ East
- [325th Tank Battalion] - Busra al‑Harir
- [326th Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Ghariyah
-
[52nd Mechanized Brigade] - Dar’a Rear
- [327th Mechanized Battalion] - Da’el
- [328th Mechanized Battalion] - Nawa Rear
- [329th Tank Battalion] - Tafas
-
[Division Artillery Brigade] - Southern AO
- [487th Howitzer Battalion] - Nawa Belt
- [488th MRL Battalion] - Jasim Spur
-
[7th Mechanized Division] - Southern AO
-
[58th Armored Brigade] - Quneitra Axis
- [331st Tank Battalion] - Quneitra Gate
- [332nd Tank Battalion] - Khan Arnabah East
- [333rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Breika Spur
-
[68th Armored Brigade] - Khan Arnabah / Sasa’
- [334th Tank Battalion] - Sasa’ Ridge
- [335th Tank Battalion] - Kanaker Spur
- [336th Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Khan Arnabah Rear
-
[78th Mechanized Brigade] - Quneitra Rear
- [337th Mechanized Battalion] - Nawa Spur
- [338th Mechanized Battalion] - Da’el Line
- [339th Tank Battalion] - Jasim Rear
-
[Division Artillery Brigade] - Southern AO
- [589th Howitzer Battalion] - Quneitra Rear
- [590th MRL Battalion] - Khan Arnabah Rear
-
[4th Mechanized Division] - North West (Lebanese border)
-
[1st Armored Brigade] - Zabadani Belt
- [341st Tank Battalion] - Zabadani
- [342nd Tank Battalion] - Bloudan
- [343rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Madaya
-
[61st Mechanized Brigade] - Rif Dimashq NW
- [344th Mechanized Battalion] - Serghaya
- [345th Mechanized Battalion] - Rankous
- [346th Tank Battalion] - Assal al‑Ward
-
[89th Mechanized Brigade] - Wadi Barada
- [347th Mechanized Battalion] - Ain al‑Fijah
- [348th Mechanized Battalion] - Deir Qanun
- [349th Tank Battalion] - Dreij
-
[Division Artillery Brigade] - NW Front
- [691st Howitzer Battalion] - Wadi Barada
- [692nd MRL Battalion] - Zabadani
-
[2nd Reserve Armored Division] - Aleppo AO, Al-Safirah HQ
-
[14th Armored Brigade] - Aleppo West
- [351st Tank Battalion] (-) - Rashidin
- [352nd Tank Battalion] (–) - Khan al‑Asal
- [353rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Anadan Line
-
[15th Armored Brigade] - Aleppo North
- [354th Tank Battalion] (-) - Handarat
- [355th Tank Battalion] (–) - Mallah Farms
- [356th Mechanized Infantry Battalion] - Castello
-
[19th Mechanized Brigade] - Aleppo Rear
- [357th Mechanized Battalion] (-) - Safirah Road
- [358th Mechanized Battalion] (–) - Sheikh Najjar
- [359th Tank Battalion] - Kuweires Spur
-
[Division Artillery Brigade] - Aleppo AO
- [781st Howitzer Battalion] (-) - Khan al‑Asal
- [782nd MRL Battalion] (–) - Safirah
-
[12th Cadre Motorized Infantry Division] - Aleppo AO
-
[Cadre Armored Infantry Brigade] - Aleppo West
- [361st Cadre Arm Inf Battalion] (-) - Rashidin
-
[Cadre Motorized Infantry Brigade] - Aleppo North
- [362nd Cadre Mot Inf Battalion] (–) - Handarat
-
[Cadre Motorized Infantry Brigade] - Aleppo Rear
- [363rd Cadre Mot Inf Battalion] - Sheikh Najjar
-
[13th Cadre Motorized Infantry Division] - Aleppo AO
-
[Cadre Armored Infantry Brigade] - Aleppo West
- [371st Cadre Arm Inf Battalion] (-) - Kafr Joum
-
[Cadre Motorized Infantry Brigade] - Aleppo North
- [372nd Cadre Mot Inf Battalion] (–) - Kafr Hamra
-
[Cadre Motorized Infantry Brigade] - Aleppo Rear
- [373rd Cadre Mot Inf Battalion] - Azaz Road
-
[11th Armored Division] - Homs / Hama Corridor
- [60th Armored Brigade] - Homs North
- [601st Tank Battalion] (–) - Rastan (urban)
- [602nd Tank Battalion] (-) - Talbiseh
- [603rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion] (-) - Homs Ring
- [67th Mechanized Brigade] - Hama South
- [604th Mechanized Battalion] (-) - Salamiyah Road
- [605th Mechanized Battalion] - Aqrab
- [606th Tank Battalion] (–) - Masyaf Road
- [Division Artillery Group] - Hama/Homs
- [691st Howitzer Battalion] - Hama East
- [692nd MRL Battalion] - Furqlus
-
[17th Reserve Division] - Raqqa / Deir ez‑Zor
- [Reserve Brigade (North)] - Raqqa
- [701st Reserve Battalion] (–) - Raqqa (urban)
- [702nd Reserve Battalion] (–) - Tell Abyad Road
- [711th Mortar Battalion] (–) - Tabqa Fringe
- [Reserve Brigade (East)] - Deir ez‑Zor
- [721st Reserve Battalion] (–) - Deir ez‑Zor (urban)
- [722nd Reserve Battalion] (–) - Al Mayadin Road
- [731st Rocket Battery] (–) - Panorama Roundabout
- [Division Artillery Group] - Deir ez‑Zor
- [791st Howitzer Battalion] (–) - Al Baghiliyah
-
[14th Special Forces Division] - Detached (Aleppo, Homs, Damascus)
- [Special Forces Brigade (A)] - Damascus
- [901st SF Battalion] (-) - Darayya
- [902nd SF Battalion] - Qaboun
- [Special Forces Brigade (B)] - Homs
- [903rd SF Battalion] (–) - Homs Old City
- [904th SF Battalion] - Al Waer
- [Special Forces Brigade ©] - Aleppo
- [905th SF Battalion] (–) - Aleppo (urban)
-
[Independent/Support]
- [Missile Command (HQ Aleppo)] - Aleppo
- [96th Missile Brigade] - Aleppo Sector
- [941st Missile Battalion] - SS‑1
- [942nd Missile Battalion] - SS‑1
- [943rd Missile Battalion] - SS‑1
- [944th Missile Battalion] - SS‑1
- [97th Missile Brigade] - Central Sector
- [951st Missile Battalion] - Iskander
- [952nd Missile Battalion] - Iskander
- [953rd Missile Battalion] - Iskander
- [98th Missile Brigade] - Western Sector
- [961st Missile Battalion] - SS‑1
- [962nd Missile Battalion] - SS‑1
- [963rd Missile Battalion] - SS‑1
- [99th Missile Brigade] - Eastern Sector
- [971st Missile Battalion] - Iskander
- [972nd Missile Battalion] - Iskander
- [973rd Missile Battalion] - Iskander
- [974th Missile Battalion] - Iskander
- [Coastal Defense Group] - Latakia/Tartus
- [951st Coastal Artillery Battalion] - Tartus
- [952nd AAA Battalion] - Latakia
- [National Defense Forces (NDF)] - Urban West
- [961st Damascus Composite Battalion] (–) - Outer Belts (urban)
- [962nd Homs Composite Battalion] (–) - Old City (urban)
- [963rd Hama Composite Battalion] (-) - Hama
| Formation |
Type |
AO/Location |
Subordinate Units (primary systems) |
| 24th Air Defense Division |
AAD Division |
Damascus/Jabab/Homs |
11th AAD Bde (SA‑2/SA‑3); 48th AAD Bde (SA‑2/SA‑3); 19th Bde (SA‑6); 159th Regt (SA‑3); 145th AAD Bde (attached) |
| 26th Air Defense Division |
AAD Division |
Homs/Latakia/Tartus/Aleppo/Hama/Tiyas |
57th Bde (SA‑6); 41st Bde (SA‑3/SA‑2); 37th Bde (SA‑3/SA‑2); 71st Bde (SA‑3/SA‑2); 158th Regt (SA‑5); 157th Regt (SA‑3); 103rd AAD Bde (attached); 146th AAD Bde (attached); 156th AAD Bde (attached); 305th Regt (attached); 306th Regt (attached) |
-
[24th Air Defense Division] - Damascus / Jabab / Homs
-
[11th AAD Brigade] - Damascus
- [831st Firing Battalion (SA‑2)] - Damascus Sector
- [832nd Firing Battalion (SA‑3)] - Damascus Sector
- [833rd Firing Battalion (SA‑3)] - Damascus Sector
-
[48th AAD Brigade] - Jabab
- [834th Firing Battalion (SA‑2)] - Jabab Site A
- [835th Firing Battalion (SA‑2)] - Jabab Site B
- [836th Firing Battalion (SA‑3)] - Jabab Site C
-
[19th AAD Brigade] - Homs (2K12 Kub)
- [837th Firing Battalion (SA‑6)] - Homs Belt
- [838th Firing Battalion (SA‑6)] - Homs Belt
- [839th Firing Battalion (SA‑6)] - Homs Belt
-
[159th AAD Regiment] - Damascus/Homs (S‑125)
- [840th Firing Battalion (SA‑3)] - Sector Node 1
- [841st Firing Battalion (SA‑3)] - Sector Node 2
-
[145th AAD Brigade] - Southern Hauran
- [864th Mixed Firing Battalion] - South Site A
- [865th Mixed Firing Battalion] - South Site B
-
[26th Air Defense Division] - Homs / Latakia / Tartus
-
[57th AAD Brigade] - Homs (2K12 Kub)
- [842nd Firing Battalion (SA‑6)] - Homs Sector
- [843rd Firing Battalion (SA‑6)] - Homs Sector
- [844th Firing Battalion (SA‑6)] - Homs Sector
-
[41st AAD Brigade] - Homs (S‑125/S‑75)
- [845th Firing Battalion (SA‑3)] - Homs Site A
- [846th Firing Battalion (SA‑2)] - Homs Site B
-
[37th AAD Brigade] - Tartus (S‑125/S‑75)
- [847th Firing Battalion (SA‑3)] - Tartus Site A
- [848th Firing Battalion (SA‑2)] - Tartus Site B
-
[71st AAD Brigade] - Latakia (S‑125/S‑75)
- [849th Firing Battalion (SA‑3)] - Latakia Site A
- [850th Firing Battalion (SA‑2)] - Latakia Site B
-
[158th AAD Regiment] - Homs (S‑200)
- [851st Firing Battalion (SA‑5)] - Homs S‑200 Site
- [852nd Technical Battalion (SA‑5)] - Homs S‑200 Support
-
[157th AAD Regiment] - Central (S‑125)
- [853rd Firing Battalion (SA‑3)] - Sector Node
-
[103rd AAD Brigade] - Aleppo
- [862nd Firing Battalion (SA‑3)]
- [863rd Firing Battalion (SA‑2)]
-
[146th AAD Brigade] - Northern Hauran
- [866th Mixed Firing Battalion (SA‑2/SA‑3/SHORAD)]
- [867th Mixed Firing Battalion (SA‑2/SA‑3/SHORAD)]
-
[156th AAD Brigade] - Tiyas AB
- [868th Air Base Defense Battalion (SHORAD)]
- [869th Air Base Defense Battalion (SHORAD)]
-
[305th Independent AAD Regiment] - Tiyas
- [870th Air Defense Battalion (SHORAD)]
- [871st Air Defense Battalion (SHORAD)]
-
[306th Independent AAD Regiment] - Hama
- [872nd Air Defense Battalion (SHORAD)]
- [873rd Air Defense Battalion (SHORAD)]
41-vessel fleet headquartered across Latakia, Baniyas, Minat al Bayda, and Tartus. Composition: 2 diesel-electric submarines, 22 missile attack craft, 4 missile corvettes, 13 patrol/landing craft.
-
[Submarine Squadron] - Tartus Naval Base
- [801] - Kilo-class/Project 877
- [802] - Kilo-class/Project 877
-
[1st Missile Boat Brigade] - Latakia Naval Base
- [301] - Osa/Project 205
- [302] - Osa/Project 205
- [303] - Osa/Project 205
- [304] - Osa/Project 205
- [305] - Osa/Project 205
- [306] - Osa/Project 205
- [307] - Osa/Project 205
- [308] - Osa/Project 205
- [309] - Osa/Project 205
- [310] - Osa/Project 205
- [311] - Osa/Project 205
-
[2nd Missile Boat Brigade] - Baniyas Naval Station
- [312] - Osa/Project 205
- [313] - Osa/Project 205
- [314] - Osa/Project 205
- [315] - Osa/Project 205
- [316] - Osa/Project 205
- [317] - Osa/Project 205
-
[3rd Missile Boat Brigade] - Minat al Bayda
- [318] - Osa/Project 205
- [319] - Osa/Project 205
- [320] - Osa/Project 205
- [321] - Osa/Project 205
- [322] - Osa/Project 205
-
[Corvette Division] - Latakia/Tartus
- [401] - Molniya/Project 1241.1
- [402] - Molniya/Project 1241.1
- [403] - Molniya/Project 1241.1
- [404] - Molniya/Project 1241.1
-
[Littoral Patrol Group] - Distributed (Latakia/Baniyas/Minat al Bayda/Tartus)
- [501] - Armed Speedboat
- [502] - Armed Speedboat
- [503] - Armed Speedboat
- [504] - Armed Speedboat
- [505] - Armed Speedboat
- [506] - Armed Speedboat
- [507] - Armed Speedboat
- [508] - Armed Speedboat
- [509] - Armed Speedboat
-
[Amphibious/Logistics Detachment] - Distributed (Latakia/Tartus)
- [601] - LCU-1627
- [602] - LCU-1627
- [603] - LCU-1627
- [604] - LCU-1627
| Unit |
Unit Type |
Aircraft |
Base/Location |
Remarks |
| 2nd Guards Bomber Regiment |
Bomber Regiment |
Su‑24M/M2 |
Khmeimim/Latakia |
Donovian |
| 960th Air Attack Regiment |
Attack Regiment |
Su‑25 |
Khmeimim/Latakia |
Donovian |
| 113th Combat Helicopter Regiment |
Helicopter Regiment |
Mi‑24PN |
Khmeimim/Latakia |
Donovian |
| 487th Helicopter Regiment (2nd Sq) |
Helicopter Regiment |
Mi‑28N |
Khmeimim/Latakia |
Donovian |
| 120th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment |
Fighter Regiment |
MiG‑29S |
Khmeimim/Latakia |
Donovian |
| 144th AWACS Regiment |
AEW Regiment |
A‑50 |
Khmeimim/Latakia |
Donovian |
| Unit |
Unit Type |
System |
Base/Location |
Remarks |
| 606th ZRP |
S‑300PS Regiment |
SA‑10 (S‑300PS) + Tor/Tunguska |
Northern Hauran |
Donovian PVO |
| 1530th ZRP |
S‑300PS Regiment |
SA‑10 (S‑300PS) + Tor/Tunguska |
Northern Hauran |
Donovian PVO |
| Unit |
Unit Type |
Class |
Base/Location |
Remarks |
| Moskva (121) |
Guided Missile Cruiser |
Slava-class (Project 1164) |
Eastern Mediterranean (TF) |
Flagship/area air defense |
| Azov (151) |
Landing Ship |
Project 775 Ropucha |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Amphibious lift |
| Yamal (156) |
Landing Ship |
Project 775 Ropucha |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Amphibious lift |
| Caesar Kunikov (158) |
Landing Ship |
Project 775 Ropucha |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Amphibious lift |
| Novocherkassk (142) |
Landing Ship |
Project 775 Ropucha |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Amphibious lift |
| Pytlivy (868) |
Frigate |
Project 1135M Krivak II |
Eastern Mediterranean |
AAW/ASW escort |
| Ladny (861) |
Frigate |
Project 1135 Krivak |
Eastern Mediterranean |
AAW/ASW escort |
| R-109 |
Missile Boat |
Project 12411 (Tarantul III/Molniya) |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Fast attack |
| R-239 |
Missile Boat |
Project 12411 (Tarantul III/Molniya) |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Fast attack |
| R-334 |
Missile Boat |
Project 12411 (Tarantul III/Molniya) |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Fast attack |
| R-187 |
Missile Boat |
Project 12411 (Tarantul III/Molniya) |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Fast attack |
| R-60 |
Missile Boat |
Project 12411 (Tarantul III/Molniya) |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Fast attack |
| R-71 |
Missile Boat |
Project 12411 (Tarantul III/Molniya) |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Fast attack |
| R-199 |
Missile Boat |
Project 12411 (Tarantul III/Molniya) |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Fast attack |
| R-75 |
Missile Boat |
Project 12411 (Tarantul III/Molniya) |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Fast attack |
| Elnya-class Tanker 1 |
Fleet Oiler |
Elnya-class |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Sustainment |
| Elnya-class Tanker 2 |
Fleet Oiler |
Elnya-class |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Sustainment |
| Dry Cargo 1 |
Dry Cargo Ship |
General cargo |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Sustainment |
| Dry Cargo 2 |
Dry Cargo Ship |
General cargo |
Eastern Mediterranean |
Sustainment |
Estimated Strength: 8,000–12,000 fighters. Structure: Central Shura/Operations Room with sector commands and semi‑autonomous katibas (battalions); saraya (companies) as tactical elements. Support includes Technical Corps (engineers/EOD/artillery), Inghimasi detachments (assault), logistics/medical/communications embedded at sector level.
-
[Central Command (Shura Council)] - Strategic C2
- [Operations Room] - Campaign planning/synchronization
- [Security Office] - Internal security/CI
- [Media Wing] - IO/propaganda/recruitment
-
[Aleppo Sector Command] - Northern Urban Axis
- [AS‑01 Katiba] - Aleppo City (urban ops)
- [AS‑02 Katiba] - Northern Aleppo (border approaches)
- [AS‑03 Technical Services Unit] - Engineers/EOD
- [AS‑04 Reserve Saraya Group] - Mobile reserve
-
[Raqqa Sector Command] - Central Euphrates
- [RQ‑01 Katiba] - Raqqa Urban Core
- [RQ‑02 Katiba] - Ain Issa/Tabqa Axis
- [RQ‑03 Administrative Guard] - Police/governance security
- [RQ‑04 Economic Security Unit] - Oil field/site protection
-
[Deir ez‑Zor Sector Command] - Eastern Corridor
- [DZ‑01 Katiba] - Deir ez‑Zor Urban East
- [DZ‑02 Katiba] - Al‑Mayadin Line
- [DZ‑03 Border Control Unit] - River/route control
- [DZ‑04 Mobile Reserve] - Rapid reinforcement
-
[Special Elements] - Cross‑sector
- [ING‑A Inghimasi Detachment] - Assault/shock operations
- [TC‑A Technical Corps] - Former army engineers/artillery
- [LOG‑A Logistics Cell] - Sustainment/medical/commo
Notes:
- Katiba ≈ battalion (300–500 fighters); Saraya ≈ company (80–120). Sector commands exercise significant autonomy; parallel religious and military chains persist.
- TTPs emphasize complex attacks (SVBIED + ground assault), siege/IED urban defense, mobile desert columns, and exploitation of oil revenue and cross‑border networks.