References: All References are located on the SharePoint site: https://victoria.vcsg8.com
¶ Annexes and Appendixes
The CJTF-LIBERTY RAIN Area of Interest (AOI) encompasses the full span of the Haurani Arab Republic, neighboring states directly impacted by the conflict, and external actors with the capacity to influence operations. The AOI includes:
- Haurani Territory: All political, military, and infrastructure nodes within Hauran, including regime centers in Damascus and Latakia, HaS-controlled zones in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and eastern rural provinces, and FHA-aligned areas across Idlib, Homs, Hama, and Dar’a.
- Byzantaura: All territory contiguous with the Haurani frontier, particularly Gaziantep, Kilis, and border provinces affected by rocket, artillery, and refugee flows.
- Regional Neighbors: Eastern Tigris, Kurdistan (Qamishli region), and Gandhara, as sources of foreign fighters, arms transit, and sanctuary.
- External Enablers: Donovian forces and materiel moving through Latakia, Tartus Naval Base, and Damascus International Airport; Olvanan diplomatic and intelligence support.
- Operational Depth: Mediterranean littorals supporting Donovian deployments, NATO maritime task groups, and air corridors transiting through Turkey and allied states.
The AOI extends beyond immediate tactical objectives to include regional refugee movements, chemical weapons disposition, extremist network linkages, and Donovian expeditionary activity, all of which can directly alter the conditions within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
The CJTF–Liberty Rain area of operations includes the land areas and airways of western and central Hauran. This encompasses the provinces of Damascus, Homs, Hama, Idlib, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor, as well as the Latakia–Tartus coastal corridor where Donovian expeditionary forces are assembling. The AO also covers the Byzantauran–Haurani frontier provinces of Gaziantep and Kilis, which serve as NATO staging areas and are vulnerable to indirect fire and refugee pressure. Additionally, the AO extends into Gileadia, where Muwafaq Salti Air Base functions as a key NATO forward operating location for strike, ISR, and refueling missions in support of buffer zone enforcement and deep interdiction.
The AO features three dominant corridors:
- Western Corridor: Coastal plain anchored by Latakia, Tartus, and Damascus. Terrain favors static defense and provides LOCs for Donovian reinforcement.
- Central Corridor: Mountainous belts and urbanized valleys around Homs and Hama. Terrain channels maneuver and complicates armored operations.
- Eastern Corridor: Open desert stretching through Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Terrain favors mechanized maneuver but offers limited concealment.
Urban concentrations at Damascus, Aleppo periphery, Idlib, and Raqqa pose significant challenges to NATO precision strike and ground operations. Border terrain around Gaziantep and Kilis is critical for NATO staging and sustainment. Muwafaq Salti AB in Gileadia sits on open plateau terrain, enabling rapid NATO air sortie generation and extending reach into eastern Hauran.
March weather in the AO is characterized by overcast skies, intermittent rain, and reduced visibility. Daytime temperatures average mid-60s°F with lows in the 40s°F at night. Wet conditions degrade mobility on unpaved routes and increase the risk of cold-weather injuries for inadequately equipped forces. Dust storms in the eastern provinces further reduce aviation effectiveness and ISR fidelity. Damp conditions increase the likelihood of equipment breakdown and complicate detection of chemical weapons employment.
The CJTF faces two principal hostile actors: the Haurani Regime and Harakat al-Salasyl (HaS).
- (a) (TS) Authoritarian Governance: Enduring repression by the Haurani regime, lack of legitimate political participation, and systemic human rights abuses.
- (b) (TS) Sectarian and Ethnic Divides: Deep divisions between regime-aligned minorities, majority populations, and marginalized groups fuel persistent violence.
- (c) (TS) Extremist Organizations: HaS exploits grievances, poverty, and ideology to expand influence. Their brutality and control mechanisms destabilize liberated areas.
- (d) (TS) Weak Institutions: Collapse of regime governance in eastern and rural provinces creates ungoverned spaces that extremists and criminal networks exploit.
- (e) (TS) Economic Collapse: Conflict-driven destruction of critical infrastructure, high unemployment, and lack of basic services contribute to population vulnerability and insurgent recruitment.
- (f) (TS) Humanitarian Crisis: Large-scale internal displacement and refugee flows into Byzantaura and Gileadia stress allied resources, create political friction, and fuel instability.
- (g) (TS) Proliferation of Weapons: Wide availability of small arms, MANPADS, and captured regime heavy equipment sustains non-state actors and prolongs the conflict.
- (h) (TS) Regional Interference: Donovian military support to the regime and Tigridean/Gandhari facilitation of jihadist networks perpetuate instability and limit prospects for resolution.
- (i) (TS) Information Operations: Both the regime and HaS leverage propaganda, disinformation, and social media to delegitimize NATO presence, recruit fighters, and fracture opposition cohesion.
The regime retains control of Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, Tartus, and the western urban corridor, bolstered by Donovian expeditionary assistance.
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(1) (TS) Integrated Air Defense System (IADS): A layered network of SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6, SA-11, SA-15, and SA-19, reinforced with newly delivered Donovian systems. SA-10 batteries are active near Homs, Latakia, Tartus, and potentially Damascus and Tiyas. The IADS is structured around overlapping radar coverage and tiered engagement zones, integrating older strategic SAM systems with mobile tactical units. Key nodes are positioned to protect Damascus, Latakia, Tartus, Homs, and Aleppo, while forward-deployed systems at T4 (Tiyas) and Shayrat provide depth. Donovian advisors are assessed to operate advanced fire-control radars and contribute to integrated C2, significantly raising the risk to NATO strike and ISR assets.
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(2) (TS) Air Assets: Residual HAF capability includes L-39, Su-22, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29, Mi-8, and SA-342 Gazelle aircraft. Small-scale airlift capability remains through Il-76s based in Damascus. Operational tempo is degraded, but supplemented by Donovian Su-27 and MiG-29 detachments.
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(3) (TS) Chemical Weapons: Stockpiles are suspected to have been relocated to hardened depots in western Hauran under Donovian oversight, though the full location of the stockpile remains unknown. Brigade-level forces are assessed to retain mixing and delivery equipment. Employment against rebels and U.S. advisors is confirmed.
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(4) (TS) Ground Forces: Remaining loyal units are concentrated in urban terrain and along critical LOCs. These forces are heavily attrited and only partially combat effective, increasingly reliant on artillery, paramilitaries, and Donovian-provided vehicles for sustainment and limited offensive action.
- Composition: Haurani ground forces retain a mix of legacy Soviet-era equipment with limited modernization. Core maneuver units consist of armored and mechanized brigades, reinforced by Republican Guard and paramilitary formations. Equipment includes T-72 main battle tanks, BMP-series infantry fighting vehicles, and extensive towed artillery. Elite brigade-level units assessed to remain combat capable include elements of the 4th Armored Division, the Republican Guard Brigade in Damascus, the 14th Special Forces Division with detachments in Aleppo and Homs, and air defense brigades tasked with protecting Damascus and Latakia. These elite formations provide the regime with higher cohesion and morale compared to regular army units.
- Movement and Maneuver: The regime’s primary maneuver elements are assessed to be capable of localized offensive actions but lack the sustainment and cohesion for deep operations. Mobility is constrained by attrition, desertion, and reliance on static defense of urban centers and key LOCs. However, there are pockets where regime ground forces maintain relative strength and cohesion, notably around Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Tiyas (T4 Air Base), Shayrat Air Base, and Khalkhalah Air Base. These locations provide the regime with defensible terrain, access to major LOCs, and protected operating bases that allow for more effective resistance against rebel offensives.
- Intelligence: Haurani intelligence and security forces retain significant human intelligence networks in regime-held areas, supported by signals collection capabilities provided by Donovian advisors. Effectiveness is reduced outside the western urban corridor.
- Fires: The regime continues to employ massed artillery and rocket fires as its principal combat power, including BM-21 Grad and other multiple rocket launchers. Rotary-wing assets (Mi-8, Mi-24, and Gazelle) provide limited close air support. Donovian-provided electronic warfare assets supplement regime fires with localized jamming.
- Sustainment: Sustainment capacity is degraded at the national level. The regime relies heavily on Donovian resupply through Latakia and Damascus. Fuel, ammunition, and spare parts shortages are chronic, limiting operational reach. However, in certain key areas such as Damascus, Latakia, Tiyas (T4), Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, localized sustainment is stronger due to proximity to depots, active LOCs, and Donovian logistical support.
- Command and Control: Command authority remains centralized in Damascus under the President and senior military leadership. Tactical-level C2 is fragmented, with Donovian advisors embedded to ensure discipline and effective employment of advanced systems.
Irregular threats include non-state militant groups, insurgent factions, and extremist movements exploiting instability. Chief among them is Harakat al-Salasyl (HaS).
The Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA) is detailed below, with further analysis and the Most Dangerous COA available in Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate).
In the MLCOA, the Haurani Regime consolidates control in the western urban corridor from Damascus to Latakia, maintaining priority defense of regime strongholds and LOCs. Regime forces, reinforced by Donovian advisors and equipment, focus on defending Damascus, Tartus, and Latakia, while attempting to retain Homs and Aleppo as operational anchors. Limited offensive operations are conducted to disrupt rebel advances but are constrained by sustainment and attrition. Chemical weapons employment remains a coercive tool, but use is calculated to manage escalation risk with NATO forces already directly engaged in the theater.
Harakat al-Salasyl simultaneously expands influence across Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, conducting cross-border rocket fire into Byzantaura to provoke NATO while consolidating governance structures in the east. HaS prioritizes seizure of additional rural districts around Aleppo and Idlib to marginalize non-HaS rebel groups. Their COA emphasizes terror, intimidation, and propaganda to fracture opposition unity and discredit NATO enforcement.
Overall, the MLCOA envisions a protracted conflict with the regime entrenched in the west under Donovian protection, HaS dominant in the east, and NATO challenged to enforce the buffer zone amid competing threats.
¶ e. (S) Interagency, Intergovenrmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations
¶ g. (TS) Attachments and Detachments
- NATO member states will maintain consensus on Article 5 operations and sustain the political will to support extended combat operations in Hauran.
- Donovia will continue providing material, advisory, and limited expeditionary support to the Haurani regime, and while avoiding deliberate large-scale confrontation with NATO, Donovian forces are expected to actively engage in localized air defense, fires, and skirmishes against NATO assets when threatened or in proximity.
- The Free Haurani Army (FHA) will remain fragmented but receptive to U.S. and NATO advisory and sustainment support if properly resourced.
- The Kurdish People’s Defense Force (PDF) will prioritize defense of its territory in the northeast and will accept NATO defensive support while maintaining independent command structures.
- Harakat al-Salasyl (HaS) will continue to exploit ungoverned space in eastern Hauran, rely on foreign fighter pipelines, and attempt to destabilize Byzantaura through cross-border attacks. HaS is also expected to pursue control of the country’s oil production infrastructure and may attempt to seize Aleppo as part of its expansion strategy.
- Civilian displacement and humanitarian crises will increase proportionally with escalation of hostilities, creating ongoing operational challenges for NATO and partner forces.
- Access to regional bases in Byzantaura and Gileadia (including Muwafaq Salti AB) will remain secure and politically acceptable to host nations.
- U.S. forces will retain freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean and overflight rights from regional partners to sustain joint operations, though these are expected to be persistently challenged by Haurani patrons seeking to limit U.S. and NATO operational freedom.
- Chemical weapons stockpiles remain dispersed, partially concealed, and vulnerable to forward deployment, requiring persistent ISR and strike capability.
- Strategic communications and information operations will be contested by regime, Donovian, and HaS disinformation campaigns, requiring NATO unity of message.
CJTF–Liberty Rain conducts joint and combined operations beginning March 2013 to defend Byzantaura under NATO Article 5, topple the Haurani regime in support of the Free Haurani Army (FHA), defend Kurdish People’s Defense Force (PDF) territory in the northeast, and eradicate Harakat al-Salasyl (HaS). Operations encompass a phased air, maritime, and land campaign designed to first suppress and dismantle the regime’s integrated air defense system, gain air superiority, and enable freedom of maneuver across the Joint Operations Area. Follow-on actions focus on neutralizing chemical weapons capabilities, destroying regime elite units and sustainment hubs, and severing Donovian support corridors through Latakia and Damascus. Concurrently, CJTF will target HaS command networks, foreign fighter pipelines, and heavy weapons nodes, denying them sanctuary in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Aleppo countryside. Partner forces, particularly FHA and PDF, will be trained, equipped, and enabled to assume control of liberated terrain and governance responsibilities.
¶ d. (TS) Commander’s Intent
The purpose of this operation is to defend the sovereignty of NATO ally Byzantaura, contain the Haurani conflict within its borders, and prevent destabilization of the Levant. Article 5 has opened the door for U.S. and NATO action, but our intent goes beyond mere defense — we will resolve the crisis at its source. We will remove the Haurani regime as a threat, deny extremists sanctuary, and secure Kurdish partners in their homeland. Opening actions will shape the Joint Operations Area by striking Haurani air defenses, shattering regime C2, and defeating its air force to establish coalition air superiority and set the conditions for decisive victory.
- Achieve and maintain air and maritime superiority.
- Suppress and dismantle Haurani integrated air defense and C2 systems.
- Neutralize chemical weapons capabilities and regime elite formations.
- Interdict Donovian sustainment corridors through Latakia and Damascus.
- Target HaS command networks, foreign fighter pipelines, and heavy weapons.
- Train, equip, and enable FHA and PDF to assume control of liberated terrain.
- Secure lines of communication and sustainment hubs for CJTF operations.
- Protect civilian populations and critical infrastructure to enable governance transition.
Operations will be phased and synchronized across domains. Initial shaping actions will focus on degrading enemy IADS, C2 nodes, and maritime threats. Main effort is rapid establishment of air superiority enabling joint fires and maneuver. Supporting efforts include deep strikes on chemical facilities, interdiction of sustainment routes, and precision targeting of extremist networks. Concurrently, Security Force Assistance Brigades and SOF will build FHA and PDF capacity to hold and govern cleared areas. Strategic communications will frame the campaign as collective defense and liberation to maintain coalition cohesion and legitimacy.
- Byzantaura secured against external aggression.
- Haurani regime toppled and incapable of reconstituting military power.
- Chemical weapons eliminated as a threat.
- Donovian support routes severed and influence contained.
- Harakat al-Salasyl dismantled as a military and political entity.
- FHA and PDF capable of independent territorial defense and governance.
- NATO retains unity and freedom of maneuver across the Joint Operations Area.
The CJTF–Liberty Rain Concept of Operations (CONOPS) envisions a phased, joint and combined campaign designed to simultaneously neutralize the Haurani regime’s ability to threaten NATO territory, eliminate Harakat al-Salasyl (HaS) as a viable actor, and enable moderate opposition forces to assume governance in liberated areas.
Phase I – Establish Dominance in the Air and Maritime Domains
- Suppress and destroy Haurani and Donovian integrated air defense systems to achieve air superiority.
- Deploy Carrier Strike Group 8 and NATO maritime task forces to secure the Eastern Mediterranean and enforce maritime exclusion against regime resupply.
- Establish ISR dominance with U.S. and NATO assets forward-deployed to Byzantaura and Gileadia.
Phase II – Neutralize Strategic Threats
- Strike regime chemical weapons depots, mixing sites, and delivery systems to prevent further employment.
- Conduct deliberate strikes against regime C2 nodes in Damascus and Latakia.
- Dismantle HaS command networks and foreign fighter pipelines in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor.
Phase III – Enable Partner Forces and Expand Control
- Support Free Haurani Army (FHA) ground offensives against regime forces in Idlib, Homs, and Aleppo with NATO air and fires support.
- Provide defensive backing to the Kurdish People’s Defense Force (PDF) to preserve their zones in the northeast.
- Train, equip, and advise opposition formations to assume control and basic governance in liberated territory.
Phase IV – Consolidation and Stabilization
- Continue targeting remaining HaS remnants and regime holdouts.
- Secure critical infrastructure, particularly oil production sites, to deny revenue to hostile actors.
- Establish NATO-supported stabilization corridors to facilitate humanitarian relief and refugee return.
- Transition security responsibilities to vetted opposition governance structures with NATO oversight.
End state: NATO maintains uncontested access to the Joint Operations Area, the regime is toppled, HaS is eradicated, moderate opposition forces control liberated areas, and conditions are set for longer-term stabilization.
Phase I – Establish Dominance in the Air and Maritime Domains
¶ 5. Command and Signal
¶ Annexes and Appendixes